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I.

INTRODUCTION

Florida news organizations voluntarily responding to a 1990 survey
conducted by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
reported that they had received 333 subpoenas in the previous year.'
This number gave the State of Florida the dubious distinction of having

*Associate, Steel Hector & Davis, Miami, Florida. A.A. 1985, B.A. 1986, J.D. 1990, University of Florida. The author would like to thank Donald M. Middebrooks for his guidance, Thomas
R. Julin for his editing, Norman Davis and Chris Simon for their suggestions, and Talbot
"Sandy" D'Alemberte for charting this territory.
1. THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, AGENTS OF DISCOVERY:
A REPORT ON THE INCIDENCE OF SUBPOENAS SERVED ON THE NEWS MEDIA IN 1989 5-6
(1991).
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the third-highest number of reported media subpoenas. 2 According to
the survey, Florida print media were the hardest hit: Florida print
media received 201 of the total 996 print subpoenas reported nationwide. 3 Therefore, Florida print media responding to the survey received over twenty percent of all print subpoenas reported in the
4
survey.
Subpoenas directed to the media obviously are a problem in Florida.
The journalists' privilege, which the Florida Supreme Court has recognized since 1976, 5 is needed now more than ever. However, recent
Florida Supreme Court holdings have limited the "common-law" journalists' privilege. 6 Therefore, the media are more vulnerable to an
ever-increasing number of subpoenas. Moreover, as the Florida Supreme Court gradually eviscerates the common-law privilege, the
Florida district courts of appeal continue to disagree about the status
and law of the journalists' privilege. As a result, media reporting in
some districts may receive less protection than media reporting in
other districts.
Florida needs a uniform statute codifying and augmenting the journalists' privilege. Such statutes, called "shield laws," are in effect in
twenty-eight states nationwide. 7 Such a statute would guarantee
Florida media the right to assert a privilege against a subpoena, despite the Florida and United States Supreme Courts' current constitutional interpretations.
As set forth in Appendix I, the proposed statute provides an absolute privilege to journalists called before any court or proceeding to
refuse to disclose confidential sources and information. Fmther, the
statute provides journalists a qualified privilege to refuse to disclose
nonconfidential sources and information. This article first will discuss
the historical background of the journalists' privilege. It will then
discuss the present status of the common-law journalists' privilege in
Florida. Finally, this article will discuss policy reasons why the Florida
Legislature should adopt the proposed shield law.
2. Id. at 6. California and Texas rank above Florida. Id.
3. Id.
4. See id.
5. See Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951, 954-55 (Fla. 1976) (holding that court could not
require reporter to disclose confidential source from whom reporter had obtained summary of
sealed grand jury presentment).
6. See CBS, Inc. v. Jackson, 578 So. 2d 698, 700 (Fla. 1991); Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577, 580 (Fla. 1990); infra notes 64, 72, 74 and accompanying text.
7.

THE

REPORTERS

COMMITTEE

FOR

FREEDOM

OF

THE

PRESS,

CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCES & INFORMATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR REPORTERS IN THE 50 STATES 9 (1990)

[hereinafter CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES]. A complete list of all 28 states that have adopted shield
laws and the approximate dates, of passage are included in appendix II of this article.
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II. THE JOURNALISTS' PRIVILEGE HAS BEEN A PART OF
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE FOR ALMOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS
At common law, journalists had no privilege to refuse to answer

a subpoena.8 Courts declined to grant the media protection equivalent
to that granted to the attorney-client, 9 doctor-patient,1° or priest-penitent" relationships. Many states filled this gap by adopting "shield
laws." For example, in 1896, Maryland became the first state to
adopt a shield law. New Jersey followed in 1933.'1 By 1972, seventeen
4
states had some version of a shield law.1
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
a journalists' privilege in four consolidated cases, collectively referred
to as Branzburg v. Hayes.5 In that decision, a severely split Court
held that reporters were not privileged to refuse to appear and testify
before a grand jury in prosecutions of politically dissident groups and
members of the drug culture.16 However, the Court did recognize that
"news gathering" should be afforded some First Amendment protection. 17 The Court observed that "without some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.' 8 Moreover,

8. See Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1450,
1601 (1985) [hereinafter Privileged Communications]. Only one state, Washington, has found a
true common-law tradition for the journalists' privilege. Id. n.56 (citing Senear v. Daily JournalAmerican, 97 Wash. 2d 148, 157, 641 P.2d 1180, 1184 (1982) (en banc)); see also D'Alemberte,
JournalistsUnder the Axe: Protection of ConfidentialSources of Information, 6 HARv. J. ON
LEGIS. 307, 309-14 (1969) (analyzing the common-law development of the privilege in England,
America, and other common-law jurisdictions). The first American case raising the reporter's
privilege dates back to the mid-nineteenth century. Id. at 312.
9. See Privileged Communications, supra note 8,at 1522.
10. Id. at 1596.
11. See id. at 1556-57.
12. Comment, The Fallacy of Farber: Failureto Acknowledge the ConstitutionalNewsmen's
Privilegein Criminal Cases, 70 J. CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY 299, 302 (1979).

13. Id.; see In re Schuman, 114 N.J. 14, 21, 552 A.2d 602, 606 (1989) (noting that the first
New Jersey newsperson's privilege was enacted in 1933).
14. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689 n.27 (1972).
15. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
16. Id. at 708-09.
17. Id. at 681.
18. Id. Importantly, the Court clearly upheld the journalists' privilege. As the Court noted,
the decisions before it did not "attempt . . . to require the press to publish its sources of
information or indiscriminately to disclose them on request." Id. at 682. Instead, "[t]he sole
issue before [the Court was] the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as
other citizens do and answer questions relevant to an investigation into the comnmission of a
crime." Id.
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a majority of the Justices, in concurrences and dissents, recognized a
qualified privilege to protect reporters from responding to subpoenas. 9
For example, Justice Stewart stated in his dissent:
The right to gather news implies, in turn, a right to a confidential relationship between a reporter and his source. This
proposition follows as a matter of simple logic once three
factual predicates are recognized: (1) newsmen require informants to gather news; (2) confidentiality - the promise or
understanding that names or certain aspects of communications will be kept off the record - is essential to the creation
and maintenance of a news-gathering relationship with informants; and (3) an unbridled subpoena power - the absence
of a constitutional right protecting, in any way, a confidential
relationship from compulsory process - will either deter
sources from divulging information or2 deter reporters from
gathering and publishing information.

0

Despite Branzburg's limited holding, the United States Supreme
Court developed the concept of a First Amendment "right to gather
information" 21 in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.- The
Richmond Newspapers Court recognized an implicit First Amendment
guarantee that criminal trials will be conducted in public.3 Moreover,

the Court recognized this guarantee exists unless exigent circumstances appear in the trial court's findings.? The Court noted that
the basis of this right to gather information is founded on the public's
right to receive information, rather than a special privilege reserved
solely for journalists:2

19. See id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 747-52 (Stewart, J., with whom Brennan,
J., and Marshall, J., join, dissenting); United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 716 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). As usual for this period in Supreme Court history, Justice Powell cast
the deciding vote. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). He noted "the limited
nature of the Court's holding." Id.
20. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The dissenters' concerns were
well-heeded. By 1990, virtually all federal circuits and many state courts recognized at least
some qualified privilege for the media. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES, supra note 7, at 3. Moreover,
all members of the Department, of Justice must obtain permission from the Attorney General
before serving subpoenas on media in both civil and criminal cases. 28 C.F.R. §50.10 (1991).
21. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980).
22. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
23. See id. at 580-81 (plurality opinion); id. at 582 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 584
(Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurring).
24. See id. at 580-81 (plurality opinion); id. at 582 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 584
(Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurring).
25. See id. at 576-77 & 577 n.12 (plurality opinion); id. at 585-86 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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That the right to attend [a trial] may be exercised by people
less frequently today when information as to trials generally
reaches them by way of print and electronic media in no
way alters the basic right. Instead of relying upon personal
observation or reports from neighbors as in the past, most
people receive information concerning trials through the
media whose representatives "are entitled to the same rights
[to attend trials] as the general public."'26
The concept that the journalists' privilege is grounded in the public's
right to receive information, rather than the journalists' right to report, is the central reason the Florida Legislature should adopt the
proposed Journalists' Privilege Act.
III.

THE STATUS OF THE JOURNALISTS' PRIVILEGE IN FLORIDA
MANDATES THAT THE LEGISLATURE ENACT A UNIFORM STATUTE

The Florida Supreme Court recognized a qualified journalists'
privilege in 1976 in Morgan v. State.27 The Morgan court held that a
qualified privilege exists in Florida to protect a journalist from forced
disclosure of confidential sources. 2s In Morgan, a reporter was convicted of contempt for failing to answer grand jury questions. 29 The
reporter had written an article summarizing a sealed presentment that
was critical of an official.30 The Florida Supreme Court reversed the
conviction. 31 In so doing, the court receded from an earlier opinion,32
Clein v. State,33 which held that no privilege of confidential communication existed between journalists and their informants.' 4 The Morgan
court noted that "[elvents in intervening years suggest that important
public interests, as well as private interests, may be served by publication of information the press receives from confidential infor6
mants."' 5 The Florida Supreme Court adopted the balancing test
used by Justice Powell in Branzburg,37 balancing the interests of free-

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 577 n.12 (plurality opinion) (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965)).
337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976).
See id. at 956.
Id. at 952.
Id.
Id. at 956.
Id. at 953.
52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950).
Id. at 120.
Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 953.
See id. at 954.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
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dom of the press and society's interest in obtaining information through
the subpoena power.3
In balancing the interests before it, the Morgan court concluded
that the only interest defeated by revealing the critical presentment
was the official's reputation. 39 The court further noted that the presentment had been revealed before the official had the opportunity to
exercise his statutory right to move to suppress the information.40
However, because the official could not show that his suppression
motion would have been granted, "the balance [had to] be struck in
favor of the public interest in unencumbered access to information
''41
from anonymous sources.
The Florida Supreme Court further developed the theme of the
public's right to know in Tribune Co. v. Huffstetler.42 In Huffstetler,
the court recognized a reporter's limited and qualified privilege to
protect a confidential source.4 The source's disclosure to the reporter
violated a Florida Statute which prohibited the disclosure of the existence of an ethics complaint.4 Relying on Morgan, the Huffstetler
court found that the principal purpose of the Florida Statute was to
protect an individual's reputation, 45 and, in Morgan, this interest had
46
been found insufficient to outweigh the public's right to access.
Thus, after Morgan and Huffstetler, the Florida media bar knew
only that an individual's interest in reputation was insufficient to override this qualified journalists' privilege. The district courts of appeal,
meanwhile, had split over which test to apply to a journalist's claim
47
of privilege. The First, Second, and Fourth District Courts of Appeal

38. Id.
39. See Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 955-56.
40. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 905.28 (1975)).
41. Id. at 956.
42. 489 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1986).
43. Id. at 724.
44. Id. at 722 (citing FLA. STAT. § 112.317(6) (1981)).
45. Id. at 724.
46. Id. at 723-24; Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 955-56.
47. See In re Investigation: Florida Statute 27.04, Subpoena of Roche v. State, 589 So. 2d
978, 980 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1991); Tribune Co. v. Green, 440 So. 2d 484, 485 (2d D.C.A. 1983),
rev. denied, 447 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1984); Gadsden County Times, Inc. v. Home, 426 So. 2d 1234,
1241 (1st D.C.A.), rev. denied, 441 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1983); see also CBS, Inc. v. Cobb, 536 So.
2d 1067, 1070 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1988) (applying the Gadsden and Green three-pronged test to
find First Amendment qualified privilege in published film footage in response to criminal
defendant's subpoena); Johnson v. Bentley, 457 So. 2d 507, 509 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1984) (finding
that unpublished photographs of an automobile accident taken by professional photojournalist
were not subject to discovery unless Gadsden and Green test met). The Florida Supreme Court
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have adopted a refined version48 of the three-part test suggested in
the pre-Branzburg case, Garland v. Torre. 49 The elements of this
test are:
(1) whether the information is relevant;
(2) whether the information can be obtained by alternative
means;
(3) whether there is a compelling interest in the information. 50
The Second and First District Courts of Appeal have provided
particularly strong support for the journalists' privilege. In Gadsden
County Times, Inc. v. Home,51 the First District Court of Appeal
recognized a reporter's qualified privilege to refuse to disclose the
identity of a confidential source who gave her information for an allegedly libelous article.r The Gadsden court adopted the Garlandtest
and noted: 'We find that the weight of authority in the post-Branzburg
cases supports the existence of a qualified privilege based on the First
Amendment freedom of the press which protects against the compelled
disclosure of the identity of confidential sources." 3
Gadsden is very strong precedent establishing the journalists'
privilege. The Gadsden court allowed a reporter to assert a qualified
privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of a confidential source even
when the reporter was the defendant in a civil libel actionA4 Thus,
the Gadsden decision places the journalists' privilege on par with the
strongest privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege.

expressly disapproved these last two decisions in CBS, Inc. v. Jackson, 578 So. 2d 698, 700 n.2
(Fla. 1991), in which the court held that the television station did not have a First Amendment
privilege to refuse to produce untelevised videotapes of a crminal defendant in police custody
in response to a criminal defendant subpoena. Id. at 699-700.
48. See, e.g., Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1980).
49. 259 F.2d 545, 551 (2d Cir. 1958). In Garland, the plaintiff attempted to discover the
identity of an informant without success. Id. The Garland court found that the plaintiff had
acted in good faith; the information sought was material and relevant; and discovery of the
information was necessary to prepare for trial. Id.
50. See Roche, 589 So. 2d at 980; Green, 440 So. 2d at 485; Gadsden, 426 So. 2d at 1241.
This test for discovering nonconfidential sources and information is contained in the proposed
statute. See infra app. I. The Florida Supreme Court did not find it necessary to consider the
merits of the three-part test in liami Herald Publishing Co. v. Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577, 580
n.4 (Fla. 1990).
51. 426 So. 2d 1234 (1st D.C.A.), rev. denied, 441 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1983).
52. Id. at 1235, 1240-42.
53. Id. at 1240.
54. Id. at 1240, 1242.
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The Second District Court of Appeal, in Tribune Co. v. Green,
expanded Gadsden by recognizing that the journalists' privilege applies
to nonconfidential sources and information.- The Green court held that
state prosecutors must satisfy the Garland test before requiring a
reporter to testify for the State.5 7 In Green, a reporter interviewed
two judges as part of a series of investigatory articles on judicial
misconduct.- After his reports were published, the Judicial Qualifications Commission subpoenaed the reporter to testify against the
targets of his stories. 59 In quashing the subpoena, the Green court
recognized a trend to apply the Garland test in similar cases. The
Green court stated, "[t]here is abundant case law that [the Garland]
test is applicable to criminal as well as civil cases and to confidential
'' G°
and nonconfidential sources of information.
Other Florida district courts of appeal have been less enthusiastic
about the journalists' privilege.6 1 More importantly, however, the
Florida Supreme Court recently has eviscerated much established law
regarding the privilege. In Miami HeraldPublishing Co. v. Morejon,6
the court held that a journalist and a newspaper did not have a First
Amendment privilege to refuse to testify about eyewitness observations of the arrest and search of a criminal defendant when subpoenaed
by the defendant.- The court rejected established law that a court
evaluating a journalist's claim of privilege in any case must balance
the competing interests of the parties. The court found "no privilege,
qualified, limited, or otherwise, which protects journalists from testify-

55.

440 So. 2d 484 (2d D.C.A. 1983), rev. denied, 447 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1984).

56.

Id. at 486.

57. Id. at 487.
58. Id. at 484.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 486.
61. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Morejon, 529 So. 2d 1204, 1207 (3d D.C.A.
1988) ("We frankly have serious doubts as to whether a news journalist's qualified privilege to
refuse to divulge information from confidential news sources ... should be extended wholesale
to include all non-confidential sources of information and evidence so as to create, in effect, an
across-the-board work product privilege for such journalists .. "),approved, 561 So. 2d 577
(Fla. 1990); Carroll Contracting, Inc. v. Edwards, 528 So. 2d 951 (5th D.C.A.) (finding, in dicta,
no First Amendment protection in accident scene photographs taken by off-duty photographer),
rev. denied sub. nom, Citrus County Chronicle v. Carroll Contracting, Inc., 536 So. 2d 243
(Fla. 1988); Satz v. News & Sun-Sentinel Co., 484 So. 2d 590 (4th D.C.A. 1985) (finding no
First Amendment privilege to withhold unpublished photographs depicting criminal activity),
rev. denied, 494 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1986).
62. 561 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1990).
63. Id. at 581-82.
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ing as to their eyewitness observations of a relevant event in a subsequent court proceeding." 64 Because no First Amendment interests
were implicated in Morejon, the court declined to "address the merits
of the three-point test."65 Thus, the Morejon court further confused
the case law generated by the already divided district courts of appeal.0
The purported effect of Morejon is to treat journalists on newsgathering missions as ordinary citizens when they respond to sub-

poenas seeking information about their eyewitness observations.67
However, Morejon should be limited to circumstances in which the
subpoenaing party legitimately can claim that his or her Sixth Amendment rights may be infringed by the invalidation of the subpoena. On
the other hand, the court did not address the importance of a Sixth

Amendment claim to its holding.6
Morejon also should be limited to subpoenas regarding eyewitness

material, rather than information gathered through the reporter's investigatory process, the reporter's work product. 69 In effect, then,
any broad principles ascribed to Morejon are unwarranted dicta. Indeed, a magistrate in the Middle District of Florida has interpreted

Morejon as narrowly as possible by holding that Morejon applies only
to subpoenas of criminal defendants, thus limiting the disruption of
extensive case law assuring journalists broad protection.70

64. Id. at 580.
65. Id. at 580 n.4. The court stated that its holding was not altered by evidence that the
reporter was "on a newsgathering mission." Id.
66. In her concurrence to Morejon,Justice Barkett attempted to limit the majority's holding.
Id. at 582 (Barkett, J., concurring specially). She chastised the majority for not finding any
First Amendment implications in the material. Id.
67. See id. at 581.
68. See id. at 577.
69. Prior to Morejon, courts recognized the distinction between eyewitness occurrences,
such as videotaping, and the "mental impressions" of a journalist. See, e.g., Morgan v. Roberts,
94 F.R.D. 121, 122-23 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (finding that videotapes of public meeting not protected
because disclosure of reporter's notes, mental impressions, or confidential sources were not
sought); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (finding no compelling
interest to justify disclosure of reporter's resource materials).
Last year, two Florida circuit trial courts limited Morejon as holding that only "eyewitness"
material is not protected. See State v. Brown, 19 Media. L. Rep. (BNA) 1031, 1032 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. 1991) (criminal defendant who sought information from noneyewitness newspaper reporter
failed to satisfy Gadsden three-part test); Walker v. United Steel Works, Inc., 19 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1191, 1192 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1991) (journalists who photographed and videotaped a
scene of accident were not "eyewitnesses," thus photographs and other materials sought from
journalists were subject to qualified privilege).
70. See Hatch v. Marsh, 134 F.R.D. 300 (M.D. Fla. 1990). In Hatch, the Middle District
of Florida found that a television station and its news director, who were not parties to the

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Last year, however, the Florida Supreme Court further eroded
the journalists' qualified privilege. In CBS, Inc. v. Jackson,7' the court

held that a television station did not have a First Amendment privilege
to refuse to produce untelevised videotapes of a criminal defendant in
police custody sought by a criminal defendant.- Citing Marejon and
rejecting two Second District Court of Appeal cases,7 the court stated,
"[w]e can perceive no significant difference in the examination of [a
videotape] of an event and verbal testimony about the event." 74 The

court characterized the compelled discovery of CBS's work product
as a "mere inconvenience. '75 Further, the court dismissed CBS's interest in asserting a privilege as merely economic, "directed toward
' 76
the trouble and expense of having to furnish the video outtakes.
The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Jackson appears to conflict

with the fundamental basis for the journalists' privilege. However,
Morejon and Jackson may be interpreted in various ways. Although
the Florida Supreme Court refused to recognize the journalists'
privilege regarding nonconfidential information, it did reaffirm the

confidential source privilege in both cases.

Moreover, it is unclear

whether these holdings apply only to criminal cases in which a criminal
defendant seeks disclosure or in which the reporter has eyewitness
information78
Finally, some members of the Florida Supreme Court certainly
believe that a journalist's work product should be protected. In his

separate opinion in Jackson, Justice McDonald agreed with the major-

suit, had a First Amendment right to refuse to produce audio and videotapes of a school board
meeting when the broadcast portion could not be produced without also disclosing portions of
the recordings withheld from the broadcast. Id. at 302. The court distinguished Morejon by
stating that the "Florida Supreme Court had to weigh a criminal defendant's sixth amendment
right to compulsory process for obtaining favorable witnesses against the first amendment rights
of the press." Id.
71. 578 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1991).
72. Id. at 700.
73. Id. at 700, 700 n.2 (disapproving CBS, Inc. v. Cobb, 536 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1988) (finding First Amendment qualified privilege in unpublished film footage sought by criminal
defendant) and Johnson v. Bentley, 457 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1984) (finding unpublished
photographs of automobile accident taken by professional photojournalist not subject to discovery
in personal injury action unless trial court determined that requesting party met three-part
Garlandtest)).
74. Id. at 700.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Jackson, 578 So. 2d at 700; Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 579-80.
78. But see Jackson, 578 So. 2d at 700 n.2. (disapproving Johnson, a civil case, in which
the district court had held that the qualified privilege did apply).
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ity that no First Amendment interests were at issue . However, he
stated that the defendant in Jackson still should have been required
to meet the Garlandthree-part test because "[n]o person's business
activity should be interrupted or its work product disclosed until" the
Garland test is met.80 Justice Barkett's opinion in Jackson simply
restated her position in Morejon: "First Amendment interests are
implicated when members of the press act in their professional capacity
on a news-gathering mission, and a qualified privilege must be found
81
or rejected only after balancing all [of] the interests."
Thus, after Morejon and Jackson, many important issues regarding
the journalists' privilege remain. Is the Middle District of Florida
correct that Morejon and, by implication, Jackson apply only to subpoenas by criminal defendants? If Jacksonand Morejon are not limited
to criminal defendant subpoenas, what is the status of other nonconfidential journalist "work product," his or her notes, documents or
drafts of transcripts? More importantly, what is the status of the
Garlandthree-part test, which the Florida Supreme Court expressly
declined to address in Morejon? If not the Garlandtest, what is the
criteria for protecting confidential sources and information?
The Florida Supreme Court recently rejected the opportunity to
address the status of the Garlandtest by declining review of a journalists' privilege case. The Fourth District Court of Appeal in In re
Investigation:FloridaStatute 27.04 Subpoena of Roche v. State,1 had
required a newspaper reporter to reveal the identity of a person who
provided him a copy of a confidential order terminating parental
rights. 1 The Roche court adopted the Garland test4 but applied it
incorrectly.
In Roche, the parties agreed that the first two parts of the Garland
test - relevance and alternate available sources -

were met., Thus,

the only issue was whether there was a compelling need for the information.6 On this point, the reporter correctly argued that no such
compelling need existed because "the privacy interests of this child
have long since been blown, so to speak, by the earlier pervasive
publicity surrounding the case and its background." The Fourth Dis79.

Id. at 701 (McDonald, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. (Barkett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
589 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1991).
Id. at 981.
Id. at 980; see supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
Roche, 589 So. 2d at 981.
Id.
Id.
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trict disagreed and concluded that "the interest in protecting the rights
of children[,] which has always been of primary importance and given
preferential treatment by the courts of this land," defeated the reporter's claim of confidentiality.8
It is difficult to see why the state's interest in protecting children
was a "compelling interest" forcing disclosure under the facts of Roche.
In forcing disclosure, the Fourth District implicitly engaged in a fourstep analysis: (1) The information was needed to determine who revealed the confidential order;- (2) the State of Florida must protect
the confidentiality of adoption orders to protect children; 90 (3) although
this particular child would not be protected because the information
already had been revealed, prosecution of this violator would deter
future violators of the statute prohibiting disclosure;91 and therefore
(4) the reporter must reveal the identity of his confidential source.Y
No doubt the Roche court's analysis is a strained interpretation of
"compelling interest." The Florida Supreme Court had the opportunity to overturn this incorrect decision but chose to deny review.9
Undoubtedly, if the Florida Supreme Court had accepted review and
affirmed the Fourth District's opinion, it would weaken the compelling
interest prong of the Garland test. In any event, Roche would have
provided the Florida Supreme Court an opportunity to at least adopt
the Garland test and thereby help protect all journalists in Florida,
regardless of the district in which they reside.
Three important points are revealed by this survey of Florida and
constitutional law:
1. The status of the journalists'privilege is in flux.
2. Florida cannot rely on the First Amendment analyses by the
United States Supreme Court and the FloridaSupreme Court to protect journalists adequately.
3. Florida needs a uniform statute that will protect journalists'
confidential and nonconfidentialsources and information adequately.

88. Id. (citing In re: Adoption of H.Y.T., 458 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 1984)). In H.Y.T., the
Florida Supreme Court upheld, against a First Amendment challenge, a statute providing that
all adoption hearings be held in closed court. H.Y.T., 458 So. 2d at 1129. But see Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (holding that statute which requires per se exclusion
of public and press from trial when minors testify in sex trials unconstitutional).
89. See Roche, 589 So. 2d at 979.
90. See id. at 981.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. On February 6, 1992, Tim Roche and The Stuart News filed a jurisdictional brief to
the Florida Supreme Court. Petitioners' Jurisdictional Brief, Roche (No. 79,295). Several media
organizations have jointly filed a motion for leave to file an amicus brief.
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The Florida Legislature should adopt the proposed shield law set
forth in Appendix I of this article. The remainder of this article discusses the various reasons the Florida Legislature should adopt the proposed statute. First, the article discusses why journalists should have
a full privilege to refuse to disclose confidential sources and information. Second, the article discusses why journalists should have a qualified privilege, using the three-part Garlandtest, to refuse to disclose
nonconfidential sources and information. Finally, the article explains
and answers the various criticisms of a statutory codification of the
journalists' privilege.
IV.

THE JOURNALISTS' PRIVILEGE REPRESENTS SOUND
PUBLIC POLICY

A. JournalistsShould Be Absolutely Protected From Forced
Disclosure of Confidential Sources and Information
Reporters use confidential news sources in many ways 4 The most
significant use is for "not-for-attribution quotations," which convey
information to the public that would not otherwise be available9 5 Additionally, confidential sources allow journalists to verify printable
items the journalists receive from nonconfidential record sources. 96
Finally, confidential sources may lead reporters to other on-the-record
sources who will speak only when confronted with leaked information. 97
This confidential relationship between a journalist and a source is
vital to society. In the United States, the media traditionally has acted
as an independent investigative force in important areas of society,
such as crime, health, education, business, industry, labor, and government at the local, state, and federal levels. The confidential relationship between a journalist and a source allows the journalist to disseminate important stories that would not otherwise be told. 8
An extreme example of using a subpoena to retaliate against whistle-blowing sources concerns a Wall Street Journal (Journal)report
on Procter & Gamble (P&G). 99 The Journal reported that a P&G

94. Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229 (1971)
(published on the eve of Branzburg, article discusses the results of Blasi's empirical survey of
the average journalists' beliefs regarding the journalists' privilege).
95. Id. at 245-46.
96. Id. at 246.
97. Id.
98. For a vivid retelling of the painstaking steps the Seattle Times took in deciding to
publish charges by anonymous sources of sexual misconduct against United States Senator Brock
Adams, see Henry, "Don't Quote Me, But. . .", TImE, Mar. 16, 1992, at 48.
99. P&G Calls in the Law to Trace Leaks, NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, Fall 1991, at 2.
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official resigned under pressure and that P&G might sell a division.'°°
P&G persuaded a local prosecutor to manipulate the subpoena power
to determine who leaked this information.11 At P&G's request, the
prosecutor convinced a grand jury to subpoena telephone records of
local customers who called the home, office or fax number of the
02
Journal reporter who wrote the story.
Such an abuse of power by a big corporation demonstrates why
the press needs absolute protection from having to divulge its sources.
The P&G subpoena violated not only the Journal's rights, but the
rights of every individual who called the Journal reporter, whether
that individual leaked the information or called for another reason.
The media's investigation of government best demonstrates the
significance of the confidential relationship between journalists and
their sources. In contemporary journalism, the press seeks information
beyond that found in press releases.103 Public officials have become
increasingly willing to provide this confidential information. However,
they require confidentiality for this kind of disclosure.I°4 "A pledge of
confidentiality is, therefore, typically the price that a journalist must
pay to secure meaningful information about the operation of govern05
ment for dissemination to the public.'
Therefore, journalists garner confidential relationships with public
officials who have their own agendas: promoting policies, influencing
decisions, and sending signals to foreign governments and international
markets. 1- The symbiotic relationship between journalists and public
officials is both institutionalized and informal. For example, the White
House invites select journalists to "background briefings." Government
officials speak more freely at these briefings than at press conferences,
on the condition that journalists not reveal their identities in subsequent news accounts.- Furthermore, "leaks," surreptitiously released, groundbreaking bits of information, often ensure the flow of
information to the public. even more effectively than background brief08
ings.

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Langley & Levine, Branzburg Revisited: Confidential Sources and First Amendment
Values, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 13, 26 (1988).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 26-27.
107. Id. at 29.
108. See id. In June 1989, former United States Attorney General Richard Thornburgh
stated that he wished that journalists simply would share the names of their confidential sources
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Thus, it is possible to view the press as a fourth check on government. Although the check and balance systems of the Federal and
Florida governments can monitor the official workings of government,
these systems have no check on the government's unofficial behavior.
Only the press, by using confidential sources, can monitor unofficial
government misconduct. This monitoring of goverment activities requires confidentiality of sources, because sources simply will not come
forward without it. 1°9 However, the Florida Supreme Court's recent
interpretations of the First Amendment have not protected journalists
from forced disclosure of confidential sources. 110
The chilling dimension of this refusal to protect confidential sources
becomes even more clear when one considers that the government
frequently is the entity seeking the source of the government leak.
In these circumstances, the government may use its legitimate interest
in preventing the illegal dissemination of information for the unconstitutional purpose of punishing speech with which it disagrees. "[I]t
is difficult to draw a meaningful distinction between a right to gather
news, on the one hand, and governmentally imposed punishment for
publishing news, on the other."' However, courts have failed to acknowledge this serious problem when confronted with First Amend2
ment challenges to government-initiated subpoenas."
This year, perhaps the most frightening example of government
abuse of its subpoena power ironically had the potential to destroy
Branzburg. The United States Senate subpoenaed Nina Totenberg of
National Public Radio and Timothy Phelps of New York Newsday to
determine who leaked Anita Hill's charges of sexual harrassment
against United States Supreme Court Justice nominee, Clarence
Thomas, which resulted in the Senate Judiciary Committee scheduling

who leak information about the federal government because 'every leaker in town would be
gone by sundown."' CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES, supra note 7, at 2. As the Reporter's Committee
for Freedom of the Press notes, 'Thornburgh's remarks underscore the complete lack of understanding in certain segments of government of the news media's need to remain an independent
reporter of government activities, rather than a keeper of its secrets." Id.
109. Langley & Levine, supra note 103, at 44.
110. See supra notes 62-65 & 59-63 and accompanying text.
111. Langley & Levine, supra note 103, at 46.
112. See id. For example, Langley and Levine cite instances of journalists held in contempt
for refusing to testify. Id. These commentators suggest that a journalist who is held in contempt
for refusing to testify during grand jury proceedings is "effectively receiving punishment based
on both the content of his published work and his newsgathering techniques." Id. A journalist
who is held in contempt for refusing to testify as a defendant in a defamation action is "sanctioned
both for publishing information critical of a public official, and for receiving information from a
confidential source." Id.
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the Thomas-Hill hearings. For good or bad, those hearings, which, of
course, ultimately resulted in Thomas' appointment, sparked debate,
divided a country, and had the American public more concerned about
American civics since the Watergate hearings in the early 1970s. 113
To their credit, Totenberg and Phelps both claimed they will not reveal
4
their sources."1
The First Amendment right to gather information, as construed
by the Florida courts, insufficiently protects journalists and their confidential sources from the government's misuse of discovery procedures. As one student commentator noted,
[A]lthough the government cannot prevent a reporter from
investigating a story, it may be permitted to retrieve what
the reporter has gathered. The press believes that the longterm repercussion of protecting only the mechanical processes of newsgathering and distributing, and not the news
itself, is the government's use of the reporter as an investigative tool, and the undermining of the press's role as the
watchdog of government behavior. 115
The relationship between the press and confidential sources can
be protected only by a full privilege. As one commentator observed
twenty years ago, "the adverse impact of the subpoena threat has
been primarily in 'poisoning the atmosphere' so as to make insightful,
interpretive reporting more difficult rather than in causing sources to
'dry up' completely."1116 Moreover, "press subpoenas damage source
relationships primarily by compromising the reporter's independent
or compatriot status in the eyes of sources rather than by forcing the
revelation of sensitive information."11 7 Both the reporter and the source
must feel secure that their relationship will be protected, despite any
compelling interest that may be claimed in some future litigation.
Finally, an absolute privilege would reduce the costs associated
with contesting subpoenas that seek the names of confidential
sources." 8 If the privilege were absolute, then litigants would not

113. Getting to the Source, TIME, Feb. 17, 1992, at 37.
114. Id.
115. Comment, A Call for Legislative Response to New York's Narrow Interpretation of
the Newspersons Privilege: Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v. Greenberg, 54 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 285, 295-96 (1988).
116. Blasi, supra note 94, at 284.
117. Id.
118. Monk, Evidentiary Privilegefor Journalists'Sources: Theory and Statutory Protection,
51 Mo. L. REV. 1, 12 (1986).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss4/3

16

Mullins: The Reporter's Right to Remain Silent: A Proposal for Legislation
REPORTER'S RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT

attempt to subpoena the press for confidential information. 119 Thus,
although a lesser privilege would protect the press to some extent,
an absolute privilege would allow the press to avoid the legal costs
of responding to the subpoenas.m Therefore, the Florida Legislature
should grant journalists an absolute privilege to refuse to disclose
confidential sources and information.' 21
B. JournalistsNeed a Journalists'Work Product Privilege,
a Qualified Privilege to Protect Nonconfidential
Sources and Information
The Garlandtest protects nonconfidential sources and information
1
by providing the proper balance between "every man's evidence" "2
and the journalists' work product. In CBS, Inc. v. Jackson,12 Justice
McD6nald advocated this approach to protecting the journalists' work
product; "[n]o person's business activity should be interrupted or its
work product disclosed until [the Garland three-part test is met.]
When one faces criminal prosecution such a showing should not be
difficult and I would require it as a matter of policy."''
Dicta in the Jackson majority opinion, however, appears to allow
any litigant to discover any nonconfidential information or source
merely by showing that the journalist witnessed an event that is
relevant in the proceeding from which the subpoena issued. MAs more
of journalists' work product becomes discoverable, journalists will be
called to testify more often. As a result, only those Florida media
organizations wealthy enough to pay their reporters to spend days in
trials and depositions could continue at least a semblance of the practice . 6 More significantly, as one commentator noted, "permitting government investigators to subpoena information from newspersons
without any qualifying language could lead to 'fishing expeditions' if
government investigators think they could have a lead on an investigation."12

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Twenty-eight states have recognized the journalists' privilege in varying degrees.
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES, supra note 7, at 9. For a list of all 28 states, see infra app. II.
122.
123.

See Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 581.
578 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1991).

124. Id. at 701 (McDonald, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
125. See id. at 699-700.
126. See Comment, supra note 115, at 307 n.106.
127. Id. at 307.
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Although Justice McDonald's concern was protecting the business
practices and proprietary interests of journalists, the Jackson decision
potentially has another, more intrusive, effect on journalists. As journalists are forced to disclose more information to a burgeoning class of
litigants, a significant danger arises that journalists will be seen as
an arm of the government. 1' All sources, confidential or not, will
hesitate to share information with reporters because of perceived
biases shown by reporters testifying as witnesses.12
These dangers are most pressing when a criminal defendant is the
subpoenaing party. Indeed, for criminal defendants, an unchecked subpoena power over the media could become the norm, rather than the
exception. Carl Monk explains:
It is not unreasonable to assume, for example, that a criminal
defense attorney would subpoena a reporter for purposes of
delay or, more justifiably, out of the duty to zealously represent her client, even in instances where the attorney might
not believe the journalist has any information that could be
of much, if any, help to her client.
When the journalist's privilege is said to be automatically
subordinate to the accused's sixth amendment rights, then
any attorney will logically be tempted to inject the privilege
issue into the case, even if only for possible use on an appeal.
In this sense the criminal defense lawyer is not unlike physicians who may prescribe extra, and sometimes unnecessary,
diagnostic testing out of fear of a malpractice action.'3
Automatic subordination essentially was the Florida Supreme
Court's approach in Morejon and Jackson. In contrast, the Garland
test adequately balances the litigant's need for the information with
the press's need not to be the source of first resort for every litigant.
For example, by requiring that a criminal defendant prove that no
other adequate source exists for the nonconfidential information, the
Garland test requires the criminal defendant to justify his or her
decision to rely on the testimony of the reporter instead of the source
itself.
This balancing test, which was applied for years by the lower
courts,'13 actually would benefit criminal defense attorneys. If litigants

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Monk, supra note 118, at 11 (citation omitted).
131. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1249 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1982); State v.
Peterson, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1090 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1981); State v. Silber, 5 Media L. Rep.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss4/3

18

Mullins: The Reporter's Right to Remain Silent: A Proposal for Legislation
REPORTER'S RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT

had to meet the Garlandtest before seeking a reporter's nonconfidential information and sources, defense attorneys would be less vulnerable to allegations that they breached the duty to zealously represent
a client by failing to subpoena every reporter who covered the client's
case. 32 In short, the Garlandtest is a good compromise of all interests,
and the Florida Legislature should codify it for nonconfidential sources
and information.
V.

THE PROPOSED STATUTE IS THE BEST RESPONSE TO THE
NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC AND THE FLORIDA MEDIA

Over twenty years ago, former Florida House of Representatives
member and current President of the American Bar Association, Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, attacked the common arguments against
shield laws and advocated that all state legislatures pass them to
protect journalists.'3 Those arguments, and a few others, follow with
a mixture of his and my responses.
ARGUMENT 1: SHIELD LAWS HINDER THE SEARCH FOR
TRUTHS'
RESPONSE: Most privileges do hinder the search for truth. However,
society has decided that certain other interests are more important
than discovering a single bit of evidence in a single case. Therefore,
society has protected certain relationships, such as the priest-penitent
and attorney-client relationships, by privileging communications between those parties."= Similarly, society should protect journalists'

(BNA) 1188 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1979). These courts applied a four-part test which requires the party
seeking the reporter's testimony to show:
a) the reporter has relevant information;
b) the information is not available from other nonprotected sources;
c) the party seeking the information has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain it through less
chilling means; and
d) nonproduction of information would result in substantial prejudice or a miscarriage of
justice.
While these courts apply a four-part test, it appears that a criminal defendant should be
required to follow the similar three-part test adopted by some district courts of appeal. See
Tribune Co. v. Green, 440 So. 2d 484, 486 (2d D.C.A. 1983) (In a criminal case in which the
state was seeking disclosure, the court noted, '"There is abundant case law that [the three-part
test] is applicable to criminal as well as civil cases and to confidential and nonconfidential sources
of information."), rev. denied, 447 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1984).
132. See Monk, supra note 118, at 11-12.
133. D'Alemberte, supra note 8,at 307.
134. See id. at 324-25.
135. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
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confidential and nonconfidential sources and information. As this article
describes, there are numerous reasons to protect the relationships
between journalists and their sources. These reasons outweigh the
hindrance to the search for truth at trial.
ARGUMENT 2: A SHIELD LAW IS UNNECESSARY BECAUSE
JOURNALISTS GENERALLY HAVE REFUSED TO REVEAL
THEIR SOURCES 136
RESPONSE: Journalists' willingness to risk imprisonment rather than
reveal confidential sources shows that the current state of the law is
intolerable. By enacting a statute, the legislature would announce
publicly that Florida believes that confidential and nonconfidential
sources and information should be protected.
ARGUMENT 3: SOCIETY SCREENS JOURNALISTS LESS CAREFULLY THAN THOSE PERSONS WHO NOW HAVE STATUTORY
PRIVILEGES, SUCH AS ATTORNEYS, PSYCHOTHERAPISTS,
SEXUAL ASSAULT COUNSELORS, CLERGY, AND ACCOUNTANTS 137
RESPONSE: With respect to confidential sources and information,
the journalists' privilege differs from privileges for other professions
such as attorneys, psychotherapists, sexual assault counselors, clergy,
and accountants. In other professions, the "communication," not the
source, is privileged.sa Further, privileges in other professions are
not recognized simply because those professionals are subject to
screening. Instead, other privileges are recognized because professional relationships require confidentiality and the potential injury to
those relationships from disclosure outweighs the public benefit of
learning the truth. 1 9 These factors are equally important to the confidential relationship between a journalist and a source. In addition,
with respect to nonconfidential sources and information, journalists'
work product should be protected because the media should not be
0
required to do every litigant's leg work.14

136. See D'Alemberte, suplra note 8, at 324-25. Theoretically, since journalists have not in
the past revealed their sources, the sources will be confident that their anonymity will be
preserved in the future. Thus, the argument goes, the sources will be willing to communicate
with journalists on the promise of confidentiality even without a statute protecting journalists.
137. See id. at 324-25.
138. See id. at 325.
139. See id.
140. See Jackson, 578 So. 2d at 701 (McDonald, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Bruce Hoffman formerly of the Florida Law Review has brought to my attention that the
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ARGUMENT 4: THE COMMON LAW CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH WOULD PROTECT JOURNALISTS BETTER THAN A
STATUTE 4'
RESPONSE: Under recent Florida Supreme Court decisions, journalists have lost many of the protections that had developed in case
law. Moreover, a well-drafted statute would satisfy all possible issues
that may arise.'4 The proposed statute is modeled after New York's
shield law, which has endured for many years and has been amended
to answer the New York courts' limiting interpretations. Furthermore,
many of the current statutory evidentiary privileges in Florida began
as common-law rules that were codified in 1976.143
ARGUMENT 5: THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE EXPRESSLY
DECIDED NOT TO CODIFY CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGES
RESPONSE: The Law Revision Council considering section 90.501
decided not to codify the self-incrimination privilege, the exclusionary
rule, and the police-informant privilege.44 The basis for that decision
was that courts continually change these doctrines, "making a current
codification of enduring validity a difficult, if not impossible, task.' ' 45
However, the only real danger in codifying a constitutional privilege
is failing to protect individuals' constitutional rights fully by drafting
the statute too narrowly. For example, a statutory self-incrimination
privilege would be constitutional if drafted more broadly than the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. Similarly, a broadly drafted statutory journalists' privilege
would accommodate changing constitutional interpretation.146

proposed statute can be attacked on equal protection grounds because it excludes various publications and their reporters. The most immediate response is that, even if a portion of the
statute were to be found unconstitutional, the "savings clause" would protect the remainder of
the statute. In addition, the selections have not been arbitrary. For example, the statute's
definition of "professional journalist" excludes reporters on school or college newspapers. While
this is not meant to slight contributions of the college press, a certain amount of screening must
exist. The power to grant confidentiality to a source should be limited to the seasoned professional
journalist. Because of this "rational" relationship, the statute withstands constitutional scrutiny.
141. D'Alemberte, supra note 8,at 324-25.
142. Id. at 325.
143. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.501 (West 1979) (Law Revision Council Note, 1976).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. If a provision of the proposed statute were found unconstitutional, a "savings clause,"
would allow the remainder to stand. See infra app. I. Furthermore, the statute goes beyond
the current interpretations by the Florida Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court.
See generallyBranzburg,408 U.S. at 706 (inviting the states to expand journalist protections).
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ARGUMENT 6: THE PROPOSED JOURNALISTS' PRIVILEGE
STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
RESPONSE: As to nonconfidential sources and information, courts
have held repeatedly that the Garlandtest constitutionally balances
the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights and the press's right
to protect its work product. 147 As to confidential information and
sources sought by criminal defendants, the Sixth Amendment right
to compulsory process should not require a journalist to reveal confidential sources.- 4 Criminal defense attorneys will argue that journalists should have a duty to produce exculpatory evidence. However,
as one court noted, "a citizen ordinarily has no legal obligation to
1 49
volunteer exculpatory information to law enforcement authorities.'
That court further stated that "[a]lthough a prosecutor has a legal
obligation ... to turn over exculpatory information to the defense, a
professional journalist has no such legal obligation."',
Furthermore, courts traditionally have permitted certain classes
of individuals to refuse to produce exculpatory information in spite of
a subpoena ordering them to do so.151 For example, suppose Criminal
Defense Attorney "A" is hired by Criminal "A," who tells the attorney
that he committed murder. However, innocent Criminal Defendant
"B" is charged with the murder. No one would argue seriously that
the attorney-client privilege between Criminal Defense Attorney "A"
and his client must give way when Criminal Defendant "B" subpoenas
Criminal Defense Attorney "A" solely because the attorney has exculpatory evidence. However, if Criminal Defense Attorney "A" were
Journalist "A," criminal defense lawyers would argue that the journalist should be required to divulge his or her sources. 52
Finally, the proposed statute would be constitutional even if a
court did hold that the constitution requires the criminal defendant's

147. See supra text accompanying note 130.
148. New York courts, for example, have found that New York's shield law protects against
compulsory disclosure sought by a criminal defendant. See, e.g., People v. Iannaccone, 112 Misc.
2d 1057, 447 N.Y.S.2d 996 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (quashing, under New York's shield law, a
subpoena which demanded a reporter's interview notes from the reporter's research of a murder
case).
149. Id. at 1062, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 999 (citations omitted).
150. Id.
151. See Monk, supra note 118, at 46.
152. Monk observes that the difference in result is most likely due to a "professional bias"
in favor of the attorney-client privilege that begins in law school. Id.
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rights to be balanced against the journalist's rights, contrary to the
statutory privilege. The statute contains a "savings" clause that would
allow such a constitutionally mandated balancing, yet preserve the
statute.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The proposed journalists' privilege statute represents sound public
policy for Florida. The protections contained in the statute have
existed in Florida case law for over fifteen years. However, restrictive
interpretations by the United States Supreme Court and the Florida
Supreme Court threaten to eliminate these established protections.
Confidential sources and information should be fully protected because
society benefits from the press's role as a watchdog of the government.
Without full protection, the press cannot adequately fill that role.
Moreover, the journalists' work product, such as photographs, notes,
and drafts, should be protected unless the requesting party meets the
three-part Garland test. That test adequately balances the litigant's
right to every person's evidence against the press's work product
needs. To preserve this balance against the vagaries of the common
law, the Florida Legislature should adopt the proposed journalists'
privilege statute.
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APPENDIX I:
THE PROPOSED JOURNALISTS' PRIVILEGE ACT1
(1) Definitions.-For the purposes of this section:
(a) A "professional journalist" is:
1. A person who is or was engaged:
a. In the gathering, preparing, collecting, writing, editing, filming, taping, or photographing of
news intended for a newspaper, magazine, news agency, press association or wire service or
other professional medium or agency which has as one of its regular functions the processing
and researching of news intended for dissemination to the public; or
b. In analyzing, commenting, or broadcasting news by radio or television transmission;'"
2. A person who performs the functions described in subsections (1)(a)(1)(a) and (1)(a)(1)(b)
either as a regular employee or as one otherwise professionally affiliated with such medium of
communication.
(b) "News" is written, oral, pictorial, photographic, or electronically recorded information or
communication concerning local, national, or worldwide events or other matters of public concern
or public interest or affecting the public welfare.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of any general or specific law to the contrary, in connection
with any civil or criminal proceeding or any proceeding by the legislature, grand jury, or any
other body having contempt powers, a professional journalist has a privilege to refuse to disclose:
(a) Any information obtained or received in confidence or the identity of the source of any such
information coming into the professional journalist's possession in the course of gathering or
obtaining news whether or not the material or identity of a source of such material or related
material gathered by the professional journalist is highly relevant to a particular inquiry of
government and whether or not the information was solicited by the professional journalist prior
to disclosure to the professional journalist;1- and

153. The statute is derived mainly from N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976
& Supp. 1989). One major change is the use of the term 'Information" in lieu of the New York
statute term "news" for the information protected. Another change is the use of the term
"professional journalist," which actually was added by the New York Legislature in 1990, in
lieu of the New York statute terms which were more limiting in nature. Another major change
is the creation of an active privilege instead of the New York statute's exemption from contempt
format.
154. The definition of "newscaster" in N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-h has been subsumed in
the definition of "professional journalist" in the proposed statute.
155. Subsection (2)(a), which provides an absolute privilege for confidential sources and
information, most likely extends the common-law privilege in Florida, even pre-Morejon.
The Practicing Law Institute's outline on reporter's privilege cites old cases, such as Ciora
v. Depoo Hosp., 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1692 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1978), for the following proposition:
"In civil cases and in cases involving disclosures to the press of sealed grand jury materials,
the press privilege against disclosure under the First Amendment and the Florida Constitution
has been viewed as absolute, not susceptible to being overridden by any showing on the part
of the party seeking discovery." Goodale, Moodhe, Markoff & Ott, Reporter's Privilege Cases,
reprinted in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, 1 COMMUNICATIONS LAW 1991, 559, 946 (1991).
This language seems broader than Florida case law, even as stated by the district courts of
appeal that have adopted the Garland three-part test. See, e.g., Tribune Co. v. Green, 440 So.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss4/3

24

Mullins: The Reporter's Right to Remain Silent: A Proposal for Legislation
REPORTER'S RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT

(b) Any unpublished information obtained, received, or prepared by the professional journalist
in the course of gathering or obtaining news, or the sources of any such information, when such
information was not obtained or received in confidence, unless the party seeking such information
has made a clear and specific showing that:
1. The information is relevant and material to unresolved issues that have been raised in the
proceeding for which the information is sought;
2. The information cannot be obtained by alternative means; and
3. A compelling interest exists for requiring disclosure of the information. 1'
(3) A court shall order disclosure pursuant to subsection (2)(b) only that portion, or portions,
of the information for which the above described showing has been made and shall support such
order with clear and specific findings made after a hearing. The provisions of this subdivision
shall not affect the availability, under appropriate circumstances, of sanctions.
(4) Any information obtained in violation of the provisions of this section shall be inadmissible
in any action or proceeding or hearing before any agency.
(5) No fine or imprisonment may be imposed against a person for any refusal to disclose information privileged by the provisions of this section.
(6) The privilege contained within this section shall apply to supervisory or employer third
persons or organizations having authority over the person described in this section.
(7) Waivers.-'
(a) If a professional journalist waives the privilege provided by this section as to limited facts
only, the professional journalist may be cross-examined on the testimony or other evidence the
professional journalist gives concerning those facts but not on other facts.
(b) A professional journalist does not waive or forfeit the privilege by disclosing all or any part
of the information protected by the privilege to any other person.
(8) Preservation of existing rights.-8

2d 484, 486 (2d D.C.A. 1983) ('There is abundant case law that [the three-part test] is applicable
to criminal as well as civil cases and to confidential and nonconfidential sources of information."),
rev. denied, 447 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1984).
156. This language, similar to the language used in the New York statute, is a modified
version of the three-part test used by the district courts of appeal that have adopted the Garland
test. See, e.g., Green, 440 So. 2d at 485-86; Gadsden County Times, Inc. v. Home, 426 So. 2d
1234, 1241 (1st D.C.A.), rev. denied, 441 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1983). The Florida Supreme Court
expressly declined to "address the merits of the three-point test." See Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577, 580 n.4 (Fla. 1990).
157. The waiver provision is substantially the same as Delaware's waiver provision. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit 10, § 4325 (1974). Carl Monk has reasoned that the theoretical underpinnings
of the journalists' privilege are different from other privileges, such as the attorney-client
privilege, in that confidentiality is not generally needed. Monk, supranote 118, at 60. Therefore,
disclosure to a third party should not constitute a waiver. Id.
158. This is a preservation clause that allows the court to expand the rights of journalists
to claim a privilege under the common law and the Florida and United States Constitutions.
The clause also ensures that this statute does not overturn any decision protecting, as opposed
to limiting, journalists' privileges. The format is similar to FLA.STAT. § 765.15 (1989).
This section of the proposed statute also is intended to preserve the rights of criminal
defendants as mandated by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Sections 4 and 12 of the Florida Constitution. E.g., State v. Reid,
8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1249 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1982); State v. Peterson, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1090 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1981); State v. Silber, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1188 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1979).
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The provisions of this section are cumulative to the existing law, under the common law or
statutes of the State or of the interpretations of the United States Constitution by the United
States Supreme Court.
(9) Severabilty.-61
If any provision of this section or its application to any particular person or circumstance is
held invalid, that provision or its application shall be deemed severable and shall not affect the
validity of other provisions or applications of this section.
Explanation
The purpose of this statute is to codify and augment the Florida common-law journalists'
privilege. The statute provides full protection to journalists for confidential sources and information gained in the course of gathering or obtaining news for all proceedings.
When a litigant seeks a journalist's nonconfidential sources and information, the statute
requires the court to use the following three-part test: "(1) is the information relevant, (2) can
the information be obtained by alternative means, and (3) is there a compelling interest in the
information?"', The statute protects journalists' supervisors, as well as journalists themselves.
In addition, the statute provides protection against waiver in certain circumstances.
The statute contains a preservation of existing rights clause that prevents its enactment
from abrogating any protection provided by the common law, Florida Statutes, or the United
States Constitution. Additionally, the statute contains a severability clause that deems any
provision of the statute found to be invalid as severable from the statute as a whole.
The statute is derived mainly from New York's shield law. 16, The waiver provision is derived
mainly from Delaware's waiver law.-

159. This "savings" clause has the effect of rendering all subsections and provisions of the
statute effective when any subsection or provision is held invalid. It is similar to FLA. STAT.
§ 684.34 (1989).
160. Gadsden, 426 So. 2d at 1241.
161. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & 1989).
162. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4325 (1974).
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APPENDIX II:
SHIELD LAWS IN TWENTY-EIGHT STATES
STATE

CITATION

ENACTED

Alabama
Alaska

ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1986 & Supp. 1988)
ALASKA STAT. H9 09.25.150-.220 (1983 & Supp. 1988)
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2237 (1982), 12-2214 (Supp. 1988)
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (Michie 1987)
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (Deering 1986 & Supp. 1988)
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-90-119, 24-72.5-101 to -106 (1990)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1975 & Supp. 1988)
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (1990)
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 8-901 to -909
(Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp. 1988)
IND. CODE § 34-3-5-1 (Burns 1986 & Supp. 1988)
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp. 1988)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-:1459
West 1982 & Supp. 1988)
MD. (CTS & JUD. PROC.) CODE ANN § 9-112
(1984 & Supp. 1988)
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(1) (Callaghan 1985 & Supp. 1991)
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.5a (1982) (as amended Dec. 1986)

1935
1967
1960
1937
1971
1990
1953
1990
1982

MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West

1973

Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Delaware
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota

Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
NewJersey
New Mexico
New York
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Tennessee

1987 & Supp. 1989)
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to -903
(1987 & Supp. 1990)
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1987)
NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1986)
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to -21.9,
-29 (West 1976 & Supp. 1987)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-514 (Michie 1986 &
Supp. 1988)
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976
& Supp. 1989)
N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976 & Supp. 1987)]
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, .12
(Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1988)
OKLa. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1980
& Supp. 1989)
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1987)
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (1985 & Supp. 1988)
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to .1-3 (1987
& Supp. 1988) "
TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980 & Supp. 1988)
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1941
1952
1964
1896
1948

1943
1973
1971
1933
1953
1970
1973
1953
1978
1973
1937
1971
1983
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